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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5500
This paper proposes a novel method of isolating 
fluctuations in public spending that are likely to be 
uncorrelated with contemporaneous macroeconomic 
shocks and can be used to estimate government spending 
multipliers. The approach relies on two features unique 
to many low-income countries: (1) borrowing from the 
World Bank finances a substantial fraction of public 
spending, and (2) actual spending on World Bank-
financed projects is typically spread out over several years 
following the original approval of the project. These two 
features imply that fluctuations in spending on World 
This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at akraay@worldbank.org.  
Bank projects in a given year are in large part determined 
by fluctuations in project approval decisions made in 
previous years, and so are unlikely to be correlated with 
shocks to output in the current year. World Bank project-
level disbursement data are used to isolate the component 
of public spending associated with project approvals from 
previous years, which in turn can be used to estimate 
government spending multipliers, in a sample of 29 
aid-dependent low-income countries. The estimated 
multipliers are small, reasonably precisely estimated, and 
















































































































































         
    
    
         
    
     













       







∆      ∆          
 
The standard difficulty in identifying the government spending multiplier is that changes in government 
spending are likely to be correlated with other contemporaneous shocks to output, i.e.   ∆       0 , 
and so OLS estimation of Equation (2) will lead to biased estimates of the multiplier.  In developed 
countries, where automatic stabilizers are important and governments are able to borrow to finance 
















particular, let                be a decomposition of total public spending for which it is likely that 
  ∆        0 .  For lack of a better term, I will refer to changes in this subcomponent of total spending 
as exogenous to contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks.  The US‐based military expenditure 
approach to identification labels     as military expenditures.  In that case, the identifying assumption 


















































































































The natural solution to this problem is to use changes in World Bank‐financed spending, ∆   , as 
an instrument for changes in total government spending, ∆  .  This implies the following first‐stage 
regression: 
(3)  ∆      ∆           
 
The slope coefficient in the first‐stage regression captures how non‐World Bank‐financed spending 
responds to World Bank‐financed expenditures.  In particular, since ∆    ∆       ∆     , the probability 






(4)  ∆        ∆                 
 
This expression clarifies that a simple OLS regression of ∆   on ∆    will deliver a consistent estimate of 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bank and non‐World Bank financed spending, the impact of the former on output is     .  The 
difficulty in estimating Equation (5) is that while changes in the World Bank‐financed component of 
spending, ∆   , are plausibly exogenous to contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks, changes in total 
public spending, ∆  , are not.  Moreover, since I now want to estimate the differential effects of World 
Bank‐financed spending on output, I can no longer use it as an instrument for total spending.  And 




assumptions about the size of the overall spending multiplier,  .  In particular define ∆      ∆       ∆    , 
for a given fixed prior value for  , so that we can re‐write Equation (5) as 
(6)  ∆        ∆           
 
The probability limit of the OLS estimator of   based on Equation (6) is: 
(7)          
    ∆    ,∆     
  ∆    
 
    ∆  ,∆     
  ∆    
  
    ∆  ,∆     
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BDI Burundi 24 4.3% 29.0% 15.0%
BEN Benin 24 1.5% 18.9% 8.1%
BFA Burkina Faso 24 2.0% 19.4% 10.4%
BOL Bolivia 24 1.1% 28.2% 3.7%
CAF Central African Republic 24 1.6% 17.9% 8.9%
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 24 1.3% 25.2% 5.3%
COM Comoros 24 2.0% 27.7% 7.2%
CPV Cape Verde 23 1.7% 37.4% 4.5%
ETH Ethiopia 24 1.9% 21.2% 8.9%
GHA Ghana 24 3.0% 26.5% 11.3%
GIN Guinea 24 1.7% 18.7% 9.1%
GMB Gambia 24 3.1% 27.0% 11.3%
JOR Jordan 24 1.2% 36.7% 3.3%
KEN Kenya 24 1.3% 22.9% 5.8%
LSO Lesotho 24 2.0% 56.3% 3.6%
MAR Morocco 24 1.0% 24.8% 4.0%
MDG Madagascar 24 2.9% 18.4% 15.8%
MLI Mali 24 2.5% 24.4% 10.1%
MWI Malawi 24 4.6% 31.0% 14.7%
NER Niger 24 2.2% 19.1% 11.6%
RWA Rwanda 24 2.6% 21.6% 11.8%
SEN Senegal 24 1.7% 31.0% 5.3%
SLE Sierra Leone 24 3.0% 23.8% 12.7%
TCD Chad 24 2.0% 18.7% 10.9%
TGO Togo 24 1.9% 22.0% 8.4%
TUN Tunisia 24 1.1% 29.2% 3.8%
TZA Tanzania 21 2.8% 18.7% 15.1%
UGA Uganda 24 3.1% 17.0% 18.5%
ZMB Zambia 24 3.4% 29.9% 11.3%

























mean 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 1.01 3.67
sd 1.43 1.10 0.89 0.55 2.93 3.93
p10 ‐1.38 ‐1.13 ‐0.94 ‐0.53 ‐2.59 ‐0.83
p25 ‐0.61 ‐0.45 ‐0.34 ‐0.24 ‐0.70 1.60
p50 ‐0.04 0.00 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 1.03 4.08
p75 0.57 0.45 0.36 0.29 2.82 6.04
p90 1.55 1.22 0.96 0.65 4.57 7.93






















Slope 0.138 0.108 0.0334 ‐0.242
Std.Err. (0.0978) (0.149) (0.182) (0.212)
R‐sq 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001
F 1.996 0.527 0.0336 1.298
Panel B:  First‐Stage Regressions of g on g1 
Slope 0.310*** 0.399*** 0.459*** 0.791***
Std.Err. (0.0872) (0.123) (0.128) (0.218)
R‐sq 0.023 0.022 0.019 0.022
F 12.67 10.48 12.80 13.11
Panel C:  Regressions of y on g
OLS
Slope 0.320*** 0.445 0.270 0.0729 ‐0.306
Std.Err. (0.0615) (0.337) (0.384) (0.387) (0.298)























Coefficient on g 0.295*** 0.561 0.362 0.129 ‐0.249
  Std.Err. (0.0569) (0.372) (0.436) (0.421) (0.333)
Coefficient on Lagged Growth 0.152** 0.130* 0.146* 0.165** 0.196**
  Std. Err. (0.0618) (0.0673) (0.0743) (0.0687) (0.0725)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 14.65 10.49 11.55 13.1
N 592 592 592 592 592
Panel B:  Controlling for Lagged Growth and Lagged Government Spending
OLS
Coefficient on g 0.298*** 0.591* 0.409 0.109 ‐0.291
  Std.Err. (0.0534) (0.314) (0.321) (0.415) (0.413)
Coefficient on Lagged g 0.140*** 0.212 0.140 0.0619 0.121
  Std. Err. (0.0467) (0.302) (0.237) (0.317) (0.357)
Coefficient on Lagged Growth 0.128*** 0.0930* 0.119** 0.156*** 0.179***
  Std. Err. (0.0365) (0.0554) (0.0482) (0.0549) (0.0649)
Cragg‐Donald Statistic 5.24 6.03 3.47 4.04
(Stock‐Yogo critical value for 15% (25%) size distortion = 4.58 (3.63))
N 584 584 584 584 584
Panel C:  Controlling for Contemporaneous Policy Changes
OLS
Coefficient on g 0.314*** 0.285 0.128 0.0383 ‐0.362
  Std.Err. (0.0596) (0.341) (0.394) (0.402) (0.318)
Coefficient on Change in CPIA 0.0139** 0.0140** 0.0145** 0.0147** 0.0159**
  Std. Err. (0.00614) (0.00637) (0.00634) (0.00627) (0.00675)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 10.94 10.23 12.46 12.43
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Coefficient on g 0.320*** 0.429 0.0165 ‐0.163 ‐0.423
  Std.Err. (0.0615) (0.350) (0.396) (0.400) (0.410)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 6.705 4.958 8.101 6.880
N 610 610 610 610 610
Panel B:  Post‐Debt‐Relief Period (1996‐2008)
OLS
Coefficient on g 0.246*** 0.468 0.308 0.519** 0.0160
  Std.Err. (0.0759) (0.340) (0.292) (0.232) (0.511)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 9.956 9.698 15.09 4.566
N 368 368 368 368 368
Panel C:  Pre‐Debt‐Relief Period (1985‐1995)
OLS
Coefficient on g 0.336*** 0.538 0.522 ‐1.053 0.0456
  Std.Err. (0.107) (0.895) (0.958) (2.073) (0.354)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 2.139 1.638 1.260 7.104

























Coefficient on g 0.297*** 0.0445 ‐0.623 ‐0.397 ‐1.142
  Std.Err. (0.0623) (0.501) (0.422) (0.653) (0.785)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 10.65 5.808 6.349 3.182
N 313 313 313 313 313
Panel B:  Weak Policy Observations (CPIA score below 3.5)
OLS
Coefficient on g 0.282*** 0.655 0.882 0.316 ‐0.0874
  Std.Err. (0.0796) (0.519) (0.811) (0.386) (0.524)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 5.590 5.206 8.256 12.66


























Coefficient on g ‐0.0683 ‐0.403 0.259 ‐0.773 ‐0.999*
  Std.Err. (0.114) (0.514) (0.758) (0.703) (0.571)
Private Investment
Coefficient on g 0.146* 0.160 0.151 ‐0.0211 0.246
  Std.Err. (0.0730) (0.313) (0.370) (0.389) (0.334)
Government Consumption
Coefficient on g 0.288*** 0.627* 0.662** 0.611** 0.414**
  Std.Err. (0.0327) (0.342) (0.243) (0.286) (0.151)
Government Investment
Coefficient on g 0.276*** 0.579** 0.436** 0.604*** 0.266
  Std.Err. (0.0372) (0.235) (0.210) (0.165) (0.201)
Net Exports
Coefficient on g ‐0.329*** ‐0.549 ‐1.340 ‐0.384 ‐0.327
  Std.Err. (0.0646) (0.408) (0.911) (0.418) (0.433)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 11.65 5.649 12.12 12.53























Coefficient on g 0.319*** 0.435 0.271 0.0545 ‐0.332
  Std.Err. (0.0613) (0.343) (0.383) (0.380) (0.295)
Coefficient on Approvals of 
Slow‐Disbursing Projects 0.0402 0.0375 0.0412 0.0461 0.0549
  Std.Err. (0.0669) (0.0696) (0.0687) (0.0685) (0.0815)
First‐Stage F‐Statistic 12.11 10.43 13.21 14.66
N 610 610 610 610 610
2SLS Using  g1 as instrument
Changes in Disbursments on